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FOREWORD
Liberty is the common component of the otherwise disparate triads of values in the name of which the two great
revolutions of the eighteenth century were fought. One of
those revolutions, the French, championing Liberty, Equality,
and Fraternity, produced a quarter century of strife and generations of intellectual conflict over its merits and implications. The other, the American, espousing Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness, issued finally, if indirectly, in the
American Constitution, which substituted the more sober
"Property" for the spirited "Pursuit of Happiness" in the
revolutionary triad, but otherwise presented itself as intended
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty" for the people of the
United States. It is liberty as a battle cry, as a concept, and as
a value central to a legal system that is the focus of this issue
of the Journal.
In his essay, Professor Ralph Mclnerny addresses the efforts of the Catholic Church to come to terms with the call
for liberty against a background of protracted dispute between churchmen and their adversaries, who had often used
the language of liberty in advocating policies to which the
Church had been adamantly opposed. Professor Mclnerny
sketches the process by which the Catholic Church appropriated the language of liberty by finding for it a rationale that
at many points remains at variance with the secular rationale
in which that language initally was rooted.
In a much different vein, the substantial articles by
Professors Terrell and Butler take on liberty as an element of
American Constitutionalism, and this is largely true of the
commentary by Professors Cass, Graglia, Kmiec and Komesar
as well. Professor Timothy Terrell attempts to shed some
light on the concept of liberty by examining the component
parts of its central or focal meaning. He then uses the concept thus elucidated as a criterion by which to test the correctness of a series of recent Supreme Court "liberty" decisions. Professor George Butler argues that economic liberties
have been unnecessarily jeopardized over the past fifty years
due to the failure of the judiciary to recognize the potential
of the civil jury as the proper vindicator of those liberties.
Professor Graglia suggests that much of Professor Terrell's search for liberty's focal meaning is outside any reasonable conception of constitutional law. Similarly, Professors
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Cass and Komesar find limitations in the presented analysis,
the former because it too freely mixes interpretivist and noninterpretivist approaches and the latter on the basis of insufficient attention to the institutional characteristics of the actors
involved. Professor Kmiec argues that a conception of liberty
which is insufficiently deferential to Lockean conceptions of
property ultimately diminishes both liberty and property.
There is some peculiarity to the articles included here
that requires comment. Ordinarily the pages of this Journal
are not given over to recondite forrays into legal history, or
to intricate arguments about the interplay of abtruse legal
doctrines. Thus, the extensive discussion of these matters is
clearly something of an exception. We believe, however, an
exception well justified by the quality of the articles themselves. Moreover, it is our belief that these articles merit the
exceptional treatment we have given them if only because of
their capacity to provoke the reader to reflect and reconsider
settled notions of both history and policy that may be
brought to the ethical consideration of liberty.

